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Scope: This submission draws on our significant body of published research in relation to the health 
of UK corporate governance in general and, more specifically, to the role of executive remuneration 
within the broader architecture of corporate governance. This submission addresses the following 
issues identified by the inquiry:
Should additional duties be placed on companies to promote greater transparency?
What factors have influenced the steep rise in executive pay over the past 30 years relative to 
salaries of more junior employees?
How should executive pay take account of companies’ long-term performance?
What evidence is there that executive pay is too high? How, if at all, should Government seek to 
influence or control executive pay.
1. Executive summary
1) We have evidence that CEO pay windfalls (pay unrelated to performance) are often 
concealed or ‘camouflaged’ behind a facade of complex incentive pay structures.
2) Empirical studies document a significant increase in the complexity of pay structures for UK 
executives since the mid-1980s.
3) Our research indicates that CEOs with more complex pay structures are paid more than the 
CEOs with relatively less complex pay arrangements that achieve similar levels of firm 
performance. 
4) This effect manifests itself across a range of different pay elements such as annual bonus 
and equity-based compensation schemes. 
5) The disclosure of pay structures that are arbitrarily complex is difficult if not impossible to 
standardise, i.e. excessively complex pay structures are never fully transparent to 
shareholders. 
6) A reduction in complexity of incentive pay structures would facilitate more accurate scrutiny 
and evaluation of the effectiveness and desirability of alternative remuneration structures 
by institutional shareholders, investment analysts, and researchers, thereby promoting a 
more transparent and efficient labour market for top executives in the UK.
2. Context: The Researchers’ Experience
2.1 Our expertise in this area, in terms of publications in learned journals, dates back to the 
early 1990s, and is evidenced by a number of contributions published in highly rated international 
journals in the economics, management and business areas, including Economic Journal, Journal of 
Management Studies, Long Range Planning, British Journal of Industrial Relations and Business 
History. Throughout this period, our work has also been disseminated internationally via numerous 
conference contributions and we have engaged in dialogue with government departments (e.g. BIS 
as was) in the delivery of seminars and involvement in round table discussions regarding 
consultation exercises. We have also recently worked with the High Pay Centre in producing a 
synthesis of academic work in the area of executive reward and corporate performance. We believe 
that this close involvement with the field affords us a position from which to comment on aspects of 
UK corporate governance, especially in connection with the contribution of pay structures to the 
wider architecture of governance.
2.2 Before we detail some aspects of the work we have undertaken, it may be useful first to set 
the context for this work in terms of the shifting patterns of executive pay in the UK and then to 
make some general observations about broad themes relating to executive pay which appear, to us, 
to be important features of the past three decades.
3. Context: Academic Interest in Remuneration and Governance
3.1 The considerable increase in academic interest in various aspects of executive remuneration 
over the last three decades is in large part explained by the fact that since the mid-1980s the 
structure of, and processes associated with the setting, monitoring and reporting of executive pay 
arrangements, have been subject to very significant change, promoting a natural interest in the 
impact of change on areas such as absolute and relative pay levels and the relationship between pay 
and performance.  Increased academic interest has been matched by interest from shareholder 
groups, the business community more generally and government, particularly in relation to the 
potential impact of new pay arrangements on the health of corporate governance in UK companies. 
3.2 A key aspect of change since the mid-1980s has been the increased complexity of pay 
structures for UK executives. Pay structures had been relatively simple, stable and uniform prior to 
this, populated invariably by base salary, annual bonus, perks and pension entitlement, with 
established norms in relation to each element. The subsequent period has seen far greater 
complexity. In part this has occurred via the innovation and rapid uptake of new pay variants 
featuring much greater detail in terms of their design and specification and in terms of the 
uncertainty and diversity of impacts on aggregate pay. As well as the increased complexity 
associated with innovations in pay instruments per se, further complexity is associated with often 
quite significant changes in the way that established pay components are used and how such change 
impacts upon pay levels and the pay-performance relationship.
3.3 A perennial strand of research has involved the examination of whether pay innovations do, 
in practice, fulfil their theoretical promise in terms of sharpening the connection between reward 
levels and corporate performance or whether, alternatively, they serve mainly to increase aggregate 
pay, whether or not performance is enhanced.  As pay schemes become more complex, via 
component innovation and/or changes in use of existing components, the link between pay and 
performance becomes less evident and less accessible to researchers, shareholders and even to 
eligible executives. Investigating any governance enhancing, or indeed governance-diluting, effects 
increasingly requires detailed assembly and interrogation of complex data sets.
3.4 We highlight below some of our work on the effects of changing structures and practices in 
pay on the levels of reward in UK corporations and the relationship between pay and performance. 
In each of these strands of research, the central importance of complexity in confounding `easy’ 
estimates of impact on the pay-performance relationship is evident. Where complexity is the result 
of the exercise of board discretion in the detailed design of reward schemes, this invites the 
suspicion that the complexity is designed to frustrate clear identification of any link between pay 
and performance by shareholders or other interested parties. It is, of course, equally the case that 
complexity could reflect a desire to maximise the positive effect of pay structures on performance 
and/or stakeholder alignment as captured by aspects of the detailed design.
3.5 Irrespective of the motivation for more complex pay structures, an implication, or 
recommendation, which flows from most of our work in this area is that a reduction in complexity 
would facilitate more accurate scrutiny and evaluation of the effectiveness and desirability of 
alternative remuneration structures in terms of their ability to incentivise stronger performance or 
to align more closely the interests of different stakeholders. Equally, a greater degree of 
simplification and standardisation of schemes would facilitate more effective cross-company 
comparison.
4. Changes in Pay Structure and Practice in UK Companies: a brief chronology
4.1 A very brief chronology of some of the main changes in approach to remuneration in the UK 
over the last three decades offers some context for the observations, based on our research and the 
work of others, which follow.
4.2 The era of significant change began in the mid-1980s as UK companies responded to the 
need to improve their competitiveness in the international executive labour market by introducing 
executive share options, an established feature of US boardroom pay (as `stock options’) and an 
instrument rendered more attractive via temporary tax advantages in the 1984 Finance Act. In an 
initially buoyant equity market ESOs delivered very significant enhancements to aggregate reward 
and raised concerns around equity dilution and appropriateness of reward among shareholders and 
the wider public. 
4.3 As a consequence of a number of episodes of what were considered to be unwarranted 
and/or excessive awards, the Greenbury Report (1995) recommended that a more appropriate form 
of stock-based compensation was the Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP), where the principal 
difference from the ESO was the design of a much more bespoke yardstick, against which relative 
corporate performance could be measured. This led to some movement away from ESOs in favour of 
the LTIP, although the latter was an essentially untried instrument at the time, with similarly 
unknown consequences. By the early part of the following decade, with weaker equity markets 
meaning that stock-based compensation was becoming less favoured, there was a discernible re-
emphasis on an established form of reward, the annual bonus, but with significant changes to the 
way that annual bonus schemes were designed.
4.4 To a degree, our own research into executive pay has mirrored these changes, so that an 
initial focus on the effects of the ESO gave way to greater concentration on the LTIP, which was in 
turn replaced by a focus on the more exotic forms of annual bonus scheme which emerged in the 
early 2000s. More recent work has returned to stock-based compensation, and LTIPs specifically, in 
probing more closely distinctions between the impact of comparator peer groups which rely, 
respectively, on independently determined or more bespoke and discretionary membership. 
5. Complexity in Annual Bonus Schemes
5.1 We examine empirically the tendency towards less transparency through more complexity in 
bonus schemes in a series of academic papers published in Long Range Planning (2007), British 
Journal of Industrial Relations (2007), and Business History (2013). We define complex bonus 
schemes as those where bonus pay-outs are based on firm performance as measured by multiple 
performance targets in a single performance period (normally one year). For example, a typical 
annual bonus plan can generate bonus payments calculated by reference to a mix of accounting 
performance targets (Earnings per Share, EBITA and others), cash flow, and personal undisclosed 
targets. Typically, in line with the current regulation, Directors’ Remuneration Reports report the 
weights that are applied to individual performance targets and the pay-outs that are payable to the 
CEO if the targets are achieved. We define simple (in contrast with complex) bonus schemes as those 
that are based on a single performance condition/target. 
5.2 Using data on FTSE 350 companies in financial years 2003-2004, we show that bonus scheme 
complexity tends to increase the odds of bonus pay-outs but without any associated increase in 
shareholder returns. On average, in a group of firms that have all achieved similar levels of 
shareholder return, complex bonus schemes that make use of multiple performance conditions have 
significantly higher (by 85%) odds of eliciting a bonus pay-out relative to those simple bonus 
schemes that are based on a single performance condition/target. Crucially, where bonus schemes 
elicited an award, the level of pay-out was unrelated to the total number of targets employed. This 
suggests that complex bonus structures, on average, are softer and pay more, ceteris paribus. 
5.3 More recently, our analysis of UK financial sector bonus schemes in the years immediately 
prior to the financial crisis of 2008/09 reveals a significant increase in their complexity. A striking 
feature of financial sector bonus schemes is the upward drift in the mean number of targets 
employed as a basis for triggering an award. On average, financial sector firms reported 2.37 targets 
in 2001, whereas by 2007 this figure had risen to an average of 4.47. We present empirical evidence 
that suggests that an introduction of a new performance target has an independent effect of a 7% 
increase in bonus award in excess of the general trend for growth in bonus pay in the financial 
industry. Complex bonus structures are softer and pay more, yet again. 
6. Complexity and peer selection bias in Long Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs) 
6.1 Restricted shares, granted under LTIPs, vest only to the extent that pre-determined 
performance targets are met over the relevant three-year (in some cases five-year) performance 
periods. According to our research, a significant proportion (45 to 55 %) of FTSE 100 firms use 
performance criteria that are measured relative to a ‘bespoke’ peer group of comparator 
companies, where peers are hand-picked by the board of directors. The composition of performance 
peer groups used for performance evaluation is subject to the board’s discretion and is one of the 
least standardised elements of incentive plan design.
6.2 Our latest work examines empirically the use of LTIPs in FTSE 100 companies for a seven-
year period (2005-2011) and suggests that peer group adjustments are used by (some) CEOs to 
extract income from their organisations: firms keep their bespoke peer groups weak by excluding 
relatively stronger performing peers.
6.3 The peer selection bias in bespoke peer groups and the resulting pay windfalls (pay 
unrelated to performance) help explain relatively low levels of pay-performance sensitivity in LTIPs 
observed in our early research, published in the Journal of Management Studies (2003). We find 
that, while increasing average total rewards, the presence of LTIPs is actually associated with 
reductions in the sensitivity of executives’ total rewards to shareholder return. 
6.4 In practical terms, these results suggest the need for stronger justification by remuneration 
committees and greater vigilance on the part of boards and shareholders in relation to changes in 
peer group composition. Performance criteria that are measured relative to broad indices (‘index-
based’ peer groups e.g. FTSE 100, FTSE World Media) are harder to obfuscate and might be 
preferable. 
Overall, empirical evidence suggests that complex pay structures, at least in some firms, are open 
to abuse.
7. Why does the apparent abuse of complex pay structures by a relative minority of corporate 
boards matter to the wider market for CEO talent? Competition for talent and asymmetric 
contagion effects.
7.1 A clear and consistent theme which characterises the work described above is that 
discretion in the design of corporate remuneration arrangements has led to a significant increase in 
the complexity of those arrangements in a significant number of cases. In turn, complexity, defined 
in terms of both the range of pay instruments deployed and the detailed design of each instrument, 
tends to be associated with pay windfalls and with a weakening of the pay-performance relationship, 
suggesting that the principal motivation for designing complex pay models is a desire to increase 
aggregate reward rather than to strengthen the pay-performance link. 
7.2 Of course, it is important to be clear that not all firms are motivated in this way. So long as 
some are, however, and so long as this translates into higher aggregate pay outcomes, there are 
likely to be significant spillover effects across the wider business community, as rival firms are 
required to compete for executive talent on similar terms. 
7.3 In an influential study, Gabaix and Landier (2008) calibrate the hypothetical (in their study) 
effect of talent “mispricing” by a minority of firms using a large US dataset. Gabaix and Landier 
estimates suggest that “…If 10% of ﬁrms want to pay their CEO only half as much as their 
competitors, then the compensation of all CEOs decreases by 9%. However, if 10% of ﬁrms want to 
pay their CEO twice as much as their competitors, then the compensation of all CEOs doubles.” 
This result highlights the asymmetric contagion effect that the rent-extraction by a relative minority 
of weakly governed boards might have on the general market price for CEO talent.
8. Lessons from the Research: Regulatory /Policy Recommendations
8.1 The trend towards ever-increasing complexity of bonus schemes and long-term incentive 
schemes should be acknowledged and the relevant risks should be contained. The discussion above 
suggests the need for stronger justification by remuneration committees and greater vigilance on 
the part of boards and shareholders in relation to changes in incentive schemes’ complexity. Long-
term relative performance criteria that are measured relative to relevant broad indices (‘index-
based’ peer groups e.g. FTSE 100, FTSE 250) are harder to obfuscate and might be preferable. 
8.2 At the moment, most firms employ remuneration consultants to recommend pay packages 
that they believe will not attract press outrage, and it is understood that these consultants, as part 
of their service, usually present remuneration committees with scenarios of what rewards the new 
package would have been expected to generate over the last three years, say. In order to provide 
relevant information to shareholders at little additional cost, Remuneration Committee Reports 
could be required to disclose this information.
8.3 Together, these modifications would serve to empower shareholders or other stakeholders 
in monitoring and comparing corporate performance, removing the burden of more direct policy or 
regulatory intervention from government. The point here is that the current state of complexity and 
opacity in executive pay and its reporting simply adds to a reluctance on the part of shareholders to 
invest in effective monitoring, particularly where there is a limited incentive to engage in this 
activity, given its strong public good element.  
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